Engineer's Papers Dispute Hubble Decision
By DENNIS OVERBYE

Published: February 7, 2004

[N]ASA's decision to abandon its crown scientific jewel, the
Hubble Space Telescope, cannot be justified on safety grounds,
according to a pair of reports by a NASA engineer that have been
circulating in scientific and political circles in the last few
days.

The unsigned documents are attracting attention on Capitol Hill,
particularly in the House Science Committee, which is expected to
discuss the Hubble decision at a meeting on Thursday. 

"We're reviewing the Hubble decision, looking at it very
closely," said a spokesman for Representative Sherwood Boehlert,
Republican of New York and chairman of the committee. "We're
going to be examining the views in this particular document as
well as a whole host of others." 

The documents have also created a buzz among astronomers, who
hope that their wider distribution will help spark a larger
debate about the telescope's fate. The reports have deepened
astronomers' skepticism that safety and not politics and money
was the issue last month when Sean O'Keefe, the NASA
administrator, announced the cancellation of the space shuttle's
planned 2006 maintenance visit to the telescope. As a result, the
telescope will probably die in orbit within three years,
astronomers say, instead of lasting into the early part of the
next decade as originally planned.

In explaining his decision, Mr. O'Keefe had cited a
recommendation of the board that investigated the Columbia space
shuttle disaster last year that NASA must develop a way to
inspect and repair damage to the shuttle's thermal protection
system.

While the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was
committed to developing this ability for missions to the
International Space Station, which could serve as a "safe haven"
for the astronauts if the shuttle was damaged, Mr. O'Keefe said
it was too risky and expensive to develop an "autonomous"
inspection and repair capability for a single mission to the
telescope.

The new reports challenge Mr. O'Keefe's conclusion, citing data
and references from NASA documents in arguing that the
administrator's statement "cannot be supported." 

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and
NASA's plans for "return to flight" include ultimately developing
just such an ability to inspect and repair the tiles
independently of the station. That autonomous ability is needed
because the shuttle might fail to make it to the space station,
or the space station may become too big and complex to serve as a
repair base, according to the papers.

One of the reports concludes that missions to the telescope "are
as safe as or perhaps safer than" space station missions
"conducted in the same time frame." 

The author is a NASA engineer who wrote the reports based on
internal data and who declined to be identified for fear of
losing his job. Copies of the documents were provided to The New
York Times by an astronomer who is not part of NASA and opposes
the decision to let the telescope die.

"Those documents certainly undercut the public position of the
agency," said Dr. Garth Illingworth, an astronomer at the
University of California at Santa Cruz and a member of a
committee that advises NASA on space science. 

Dr. Illingworth added that it was important to open up debate on
these issues. "We need to get real information out there, and not
just have a few people in NASA saying we know what's best," he
said.

A Congressional staff member who was given the documents said
they appeared to be credible. "We are taking them seriously," he
said. Referring to the requirement of an autonomous repair
capability, he said, "NASA's going to have to spend the money to
do this" if the agency follows the accident board's
recommendations. 

The documents also argue that missions to the space station might
actually be riskier than going to the space telescope for several
reasons. Because of the space station's orbit in relation to the
equator, the shuttle has to use more energy, increasing the
chances that something will go wrong and that it will not make it
into orbit. Moreover, one of the biggest dangers to the shuttle's
skin is micrometeorite impacts while it is in orbit. When it is
at the telescope, unlike when it is docked to the station, the
shuttle can orient itself backwards in its orbit, protecting its
leading surfaces from such impacts.

As for a safe haven, that could be met by launching the Hubble
mission just before a planned station mission, the report says.
If there was trouble, a second shuttle could be dispatched to
rescue the crew. Using an airlock system, astronauts could move
from one shuttle to the other without going outside.

The debate about the Hubble's demise is the latest chapter in the
turbulent history of the space telescope, which was launched in
1990 with a flawed mirror and repaired by spacewalking
astronauts. Floating above the murky atmosphere, which blocks
some infrared and ultraviolet light from reaching the Earth, the
telescope has provided views with unmatched clarity.
  
Last week, in response to meetings with Senator Barbara A.
Mikulksi, Democrat of Maryland, where the Space Telescope Science
Institute and the Goddard Space Flight Center are located, Mr.
O'Keefe agreed to have his decision reviewed by Adm. Harold W.
Gehman Jr., who was chairman of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board.

Efforts to reach Admiral Gehman and Mr. O'Keefe were
unsuccessful. A NASA spokesman issued a statement saying that the
administrator would await Admiral Gehman's review, adding, "At
the end of the day, however, the NASA administrator cannot
delegate his ultimate responsibility for decisions related to the
safety of human spaceflight."

Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff, a physicist at Stanford and a member of
the accident investigation board, said he agreed there was not
much difference in the risks for Hubble- versus station-bound
missions.

Asked about the board's deliberations, he emphasized that he was
speaking for himself and not the whole board, which disbanded
last September, and said in an e-mail message, "I think we may
have mentioned Hubble, but do not think it was our intention of
making it impossible for NASA to service Hubble." 

Other space experts said that the reports appeared to be credible
and authoritative. Capt. Bruce C. McCandless, an astronaut who
flew on the shuttle in the 1980's and is now with the Lockheed
Martin Corporation, said they appeared to be "well researched and
written." 

He said that the catch regarding the autonomous repair capability
was the word "ultimately" in the accident investigation board's
report. The canceled mission had been 11th on the post-Columbia
schedule. "Sooo, if "ultimate" means in the first 10 missions,"
he said in an e-mail message, the service mission would be
covered.

     
Copyright 2004, The New York Times Company