Astronomical Exaggerations
Published: March 13, 2004
  
[S]ean O'Keefe, administrator of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, seems to be digging in his heels against
any effort to overturn his cancellation of the next shuttle
servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, thereby
sentencing this extraordinary scientific instrument to a probable
death in 2007. Under pressure this week, Mr. O'Keefe agreed to
solicit advice from the National Academy of Sciences, but made it
clear that there is little chance he will reverse course. He
wants the academy to focus on ways to extend Hubble's usefulness
that do not require a visit by astronauts.

The administrator's reluctance makes it imperative that Congress
insist on a full-scale analysis of the risks and benefits of
servicing the Hubble, and that the academy refuse to undertake
anything less. The premature termination of such a valuable
scientific instrument is too important a decision to be left
solely to an administrator who announced the cancellation without
warning in January and has yet to justify the decision
adequately. 

Mr. O'Keefe's rationale has to do with the risks of servicing the
Hubble in the aftermath of last year's Columbia disaster. The
administrator is determined to put in place all of the
safety-enhancing recommendations issued by the board that
investigated the loss of that shuttle. That is as it should be,
but proper caution need not mean paralysis. 

The toughest recommendations would require that any shuttle sent
to the Hubble have the capability to inspect and repair damage to
its own thermal protection system while in orbit. Shuttles
traveling to the international space station can rely on the
station for help. Mr. O'Keefe has expressed doubt that NASA can
develop sufficient onboard inspection and repair capabilities for
shuttles in time for a mission to the Hubble. But he appears to
be exaggerating both the safety requirements and the risks of
servicing the Hubble.

Harold Gehman Jr., the retired admiral who was chairman of the
board that investigated the Columbia accident, suggested in an
advisory opinion that NASA had more latitude than Mr. O'Keefe let
on. The admiral said his board did not expect the same robust
inspection and repair capabilities available at the station to be
provided on shuttles headed elsewhere. In other words, he said,
NASA should simply "do the best you can" on a Hubble mission.

Admiral Gehman also indicated that the risk of losing a shuttle
on a single servicing mission to the Hubble was small compared
with the risks entailed in multiple flights to complete the space
station. He rightly suggested that "only a deep and rich study of
the entire gain/risk equation can answer the question of whether
an extension of the life of the wonderful Hubble telescope is
worth the risks involved." That is precisely the kind of study
that Congress should demand. 

Copyright 2004, The New York Times Company